Classical extensions of fuzzy game models are based on various integrals, such as Butnariu game and Tsurumi game. A new class of symmetric extension of fuzzy game with fuzzy coalition variables is put forward with Concave integral, where players' expected values are on a partial set of coalitions. Some representations and properties of some limited models are compared in this paper. The explicit formula of characteristic function determined by coalition variables is given. Moreover, a calculation approach of imputations is discussed in detail. The new game could be regarded as a general form of cooperative game. Furthermore, the fuzzy game introduced by Tsurumi is a special case of the proposed game when game is convex.
Introduction
Cooperation in game is often full of vagueness because of players' partial participation and players' preference to some coalitions. Games without precise information have been investigated by stochastic framework [1, 2] . Generally speaking, probability distributions on game events cannot be obtained perfectly. It is reasonable to adopt fuzzy mathematics to model fuzzy games [3] [4] [5] .
The main ways of describing cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions aim to extend crisp game theory, which is to construct a one-to-one correspondence between a crisp game and a fuzzy game. At present, there are three views of fuzzy games including games with fuzzy payoffs, games with fuzzy coalitions, and games with both fuzzy payoffs and fuzzy coalitions. Aubin [6] firstly studied games with fuzzy coalitions and proposed a line fuzzy game, and a review of this line fuzzy game can be found in Branzei et al. [7] . Butnariu [8] extended the domain of fuzzy coalitions and defined a fuzzy game. Tsurumi et al. [9] introduced a class of fuzzy games with Choquet integral. In addition, Branzei et al. [7] have done lots of work to model fuzzy cooperative game, which was mainly defined by the associated crisp game corresponding to fuzzy game. Borkotokey [10] No matter what game model it is, the representation of characteristic function of games with fuzzy coalitions is an expression of integral, such as linear integral in Butnariu game and Choquet integral in Tsurumi et al. game. In this paper, several integral representations which described the fuzzy characteristic function of the cooperative game will be listed and compared mutually. It has been proved that the Concave integral is concave with respect to fuzzy capacities, which might be interpreted as uncertainty aversion [11] . Consequently, it is a better way to model games with fuzzy coalition variables by Concave integral. We extend characteristic function in fuzzy game on a partial set of coalitions via its decompositions of corresponding crisp coalitions. The classical model is a special case of our approach.
In Section 2, we recall some basic concepts of crisp games and fuzzy games. Integral representations for several games with fuzzy coalitions are introduced in Section 3. Some properties and relationships of the several games will also be discussed in detail. We show the differences among these games by numerical examples. Section 4 studies an important case of game in which players' expected values are on a partial set of coalitions. A new class of games which depends on decompositions of coalitions will be proposed by Concave integral. In particular, the so-called game with Choquet integral form is a special case of game with Concave integral form. Moreover, in Section 5, an imputation of the new game is investigated and a calculation approach of imputations is proposed. Finally, some conclusions appear in Section 6.
Crisp Cooperative Game and Fuzzy Cooperative Game
A crisp cooperative game V on player set is the characteristic function V : ( ) → + ∪ {0} with V( ) = 0 and V( ) ( ∈ ( )) is the worth of coalition . The class of crisp games with player set is denoted by ( , V).
Denote all the superadditve crisp cooperative games by 0 ( , V).
For a nonempty set ∈ ( ), the unanimity games are defined by
Each cooperative game V ∈ ( , V) can be represented by as follows:
where
Denote all of imputations for a crisp cooperative game
The Shapley value of player has a unique expression given by
where | ⋅ | is the cardinality of a coalition. When V ∈ 0 ( , V), the Shapley vector Sh(V) = (Sh 1 (V), Sh 2 (V), . . . , Sh (V)) ∈ (V)( ).
We call̃a fuzzy coalition with coalition variable = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ), where ∈ [0, 1] is a constant participation level of player . The set of fuzzy coalitions in is denoted by ( ). If̃is a fuzzy subset of , its support is defined by Supp(̃) = { ∈ | > 0} and its level subset is denoted
If̃⊆̃, it means that ≤ for any ∈ . The identical level set = { ∈ , = , ∈ [0, 1]} is the players set with the same participation level .
A characteristic function of cooperative game is a function V : ( ) → such that V( ) = 0. The real value function V associates to each coalitioñwith worth V(̃), which measures the utility of forming coalitioñ. We take the notation V ∈̃as a fuzzy game on with the characteristic function V.
For any fuzzy coalitioñ,̃∈ ( ),̃∨̃is the union of two fuzzy coalitions̃and̃, and when ∈ Supp̃∪ Supp̃, the coalition variable (̃∨̃)( ) = ∨ and otherwise (̃∨ )( ) = 0. Similarly,̃∧̃is the intersection of two fuzzy coalitions and̃with the coalition variable (̃∧̃)( ) = ∧ for any
Let be a nonempty set and let ( ) be the power set of . The function : ( ) → + is called a capacity on if ( ) = 0 and ( ) ≤ ( ) whenever ⊂ , where ( ) indicates the weight of the elements ∈ ( = 1, 2, . . . , ).
Next, we will give Choquet integral [12] and Concave integral [11] .
Definition 2. Let be a capacity on ; the Choquet integral of a nonnegative function : → + with respect to is defined by
where = ({ }).
The Choquet integral with a discrete capacity can be rewritten as follows:
where (⋅) indicates a permutation of such that (1) 
Definition 3. Let be a capacity on . Fix a nonnegative random variable , and define
where the minimum is taken over all concave and homogeneous functions : + → satisfying (1 ) ≥ ( ) for every ⊆ and 1 is an indicator of ⊆ .
It has been proved that ∫

Ch
= ∫
Cav if and only if is convex (see [13] ).
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Integral Representations for Some Limited
Games with Fuzzy Coalitions Butnariu [14] defined a characteristic function of cooperative game with proportional values which was weighted by participation level set.
Definition 4.
The game V ∈̃is said to be a game with proportional values if and only if
The fuzzy game with proportional values corresponds to a crisp game as the associated fuzzy game. For the sake of simplicity, we will denote the fuzzy game with proportional values as̃.
Example 5. Let
= {1, 2, 3, 4} and let V be a characteristic function on which is an output of joint workers; values on crisp coalitions are listed in Table 1 .
Consider the fuzzy game V(̃) ∈̃and the fuzzy coalitioñcorresponding to coalition variable = (0.4, 0.4, 0.6, 0.7), by Definition 4, 
where : [0, 1] → is a function with the properties ( ) = 0 ⇔ = 0 and (1) = 1.
The set of games with weight functions is denoted bỹ. If ( ) = ; then the fuzzy game V ∈̃is equivalent to the game V ∈̃. 
From Example 7, we know that the game value is much greater to depend on the weight function. In spite of the fact 
that crisp games are often considered to be monotone nondecreasing, Tsurumi et al. thought that most of this class of games are neither monotone nondecreasing nor continuous with regard to rates of players' participation. They introduced a class of fuzzy games, simply denoted bỹas follows.
Definition 8. Giveñ∈ ( ), let (̃) = { | > 0, ∈ } and let (̃) be the cardinality of (̃). The elements in (̃) are rewritten by the increasing order as ℎ 1 < ℎ 2 < ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ < ℎ (̃) . Then a game V : ( ) → is said to be a fuzzy game with Choquet integral form if and only if the following holds:
for anỹ∈ ( ), where ℎ 0 = 0. It is apparent that Choquet integral [12] is an integral form for a general class of fuzzy measures, so the fuzzy game model proposed by Tsurumi is Choquet integral of the function ℎ with respect to V derived from level set. Because the case that
, so the worth of coalitionĩ s the maximum sum on all subsets which make an including chain.
Example 9. Take the same game as Example 5; rearrange the fuzzy coalition variable = (0.4, 0.4, 0.6, 0.7) as 0.4 < 0.6 < 0.7; by (11), we get the game value V(̃) ∈̃:
A fuzzy game with Choquet integral form has the following properties [9] . Proposition 10. Let V ∈̃, for anỹ,̃∈ ( ) and̃⊆̃; then the following holds:
Proposition 11. Let V ∈̃; define the distance (̃,̃) = max ∈ | − | for anỹ,̃∈ ( ); then V is continuous.
Borkotokey [10] defined the following extended class of fuzzy games, when both coalitions and expectation are fuzzy.
Definition 13. Let V ∈̃and let > 0 be a real number, for any a fuzzy coalitioñ∈ ( ); define a function :
We note that this game (̃), ∀̃∈ ( ) is an extended fuzzy game with fuzzy coalitions and vague expectation. For a sufficiently small > 0, (̃) is continuous for every fuzzy coalitioñ∈ ( ). The corresponding class of such games is denoted bỹ.
Example 14.
We continue to consider Example 9; for any > 0 and̃∈ ( ) with fuzzy coalition variable
∨ {∨ ∈ } , if 61.6 − < < 61.6, 1, if 61.6 < < 61.6 + , 0, otherwise.
In game V ∈̃, when players' expected values are among V(̃) − and V(̃), they will set their maximum contribution level to the fuzzy coalitioñ∈ ( ). By contrast, the maximum contribution of̃∈ ( ) keeps sufficiently close to V(̃) ∈̃.
Proposition 15. Let V ∈̃; then is monotone nondecreasing when the game V is monotone nondecreasing. That is, for every pair of fuzzy coalitions̃and̃such that̃⊆̃it would imply
Proposition 16. Let V ∈̃; then the game is
when (̃∨̃) = 0 and V ∈̃is superadditive,
when V ∈̃is convex.
A New Fuzzy Games with Concave Integral
As mentioned above, the present forms for game with fuzzy coalitions are only limited to some special games. Next, we will consider another extended game with fuzzy coalitions, that is, the fuzzy game with Concave integral, where Tsurumi game can be taken as a special case for the proposed new game. Firstly, we recall the fuzzy capacity and the Concave integral.
Definition 17. Let̃∈ ( ); the pair (V,̃) is said to be a fuzzy capacity game if V : ( ) → + ∪ {0} is monotonic, continuous, and there is a positive such that V( ) ≤ | | for every ∈ (̃).
Definition 18. Let̃∈ ( ); the pair (V,̃) is said to be an additive fuzzy capacity game, for every fuzzy coalition variable ∈ (̃), if there is a nonnegative constant vector
. It is obvious that Butnariu game is an additive fuzzy capacity game. However, the fuzzy coalitioñprobably contains only some extremes or discrete points of the domain of (̃), and̃⊆ ( ). Therefore, V might be partially nonadditive or non-additive on its domains.
Let be a random variable; a subdecomposition of is a finite summation ∑ ⊆ that satisfies Hence, the subdecomposition is a maximum decomposition of .
On the other hand, if we consider other subdecompositions 1 = {2}, 2 = {1, 2}, and 3 = {1, 2, 3}; take 1 = 0.2, We note that this subdecomposition is also a maximum decomposition of and 1 ⊆ 2 ⊆ 3 .
However, let V( ) = 10, V({1, 2}) = V({1, 3}) = 5, V({2, 3}) = 9 and V({1}) = V({2}) = V({3}) = 3. It is not hard to find that the value of additive capacity on different maximum decomposition can be different.
Definition 21. Let V be a capacity over , and let be a nonnegative random variable; define the Concave integral as
where 1 is an indicator of ⊆ .
Definition 22. Let V be a fuzzy capacity game, and let̃∈ ( ) be a random fuzzy coalition with nonnegative variable = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ); define a game with Concave integral form
Let 1 be an indicator of ⊆ that
And the minimum is taken all over concave and homogeneous functions : + → such that (1 ) ≥ V( ) for every ⊆ .
By Definition 22, V
Cav (̃) is based on decomposition of random variables of crisp game and can be gained by values on crisp coalitions which correspond to subdecompositions of . We denote all fuzzy games defined by Concave integral as̃C av . It is easy to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 23. Let V ∈̃V be a fuzzy capacity game, for every random fuzzy coalitioñ∈ ( ) with nonnegative variable = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ); then
The game V V : ( ) → + ∪ {0} can also be calculated by
Remark 24. When ⊆ ,
It can be easily seen that
It means that the fuzzy game with Concave integral extends crisp game.
Since crisp game V( ), ∈ [̃] can be represented by simple unanimity games; it is easy to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 25. Let V ∈ V ( ) be a fuzzy capacity game, and let̃∈ ( ) be a random fuzzy coalition with nonnegative variable = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ); then
Example 26. Let = {1, 2, 3} and let V be a characteristic function on . V({1}) = V({2}) = V({3}) = 2, V({1, 3}) = 8, V({1, 2}) = 9, V({2, 3}) = 5, and V({1, 2, 3}) = 10. Let ∈ ( ) with the fuzzy coalition variable = (1, 0.4, 0.6). If V ∈̃, rearrange elements of as 0.4 < 0.6 < 1; then by (11) ,
We note that
Example 27. Consider again Example 5, for the fuzzy coalitioñ, by inequality (28), we have 
Thus,
We know that V Cav (̃) = ∫ Cav V is the maximum of the values ∑ =1 ( ) among all possible decompositions ofw ith the coalition variable .
In the fuzzy game given by Tsurumi et al., the Choquet integral of nonnegative ℎ with respect to a capacity V is
where is the set of all rates of participation such that 0 = ℎ 0 < ℎ 1 < ℎ 2 < ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ < ℎ (̃) and (•) is a permutation of .
decomposition of . That is, the Choquet integral is defined under the special decomposition of . By contrast, all possible decompositions are allowed in the Concave integral.
In this way, it implies that
Lemma 28. Let V ∈ V ( ) be a fuzzy capacity game, and let̃∈ ( ) be a random fuzzy coalition with nonnegative variable = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ); then
where ⊇ (∀ < ).
Proof. Let V ∈ Cav ( ) be a fuzzy capacity game,̃∈ ( ) and = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) ; by Definition 8, we get
On the other hand, by
is a maximum decomposition with the fuzzy coalition vari-
For any two nonnegative random fuzzy coalitions̃and with variables and , define distance on ( ) by (̃,̃) = max ∈ | − |.
Theorem 29. Let V ∈
V ( ) be a fuzzy capacity game, then V is continuous with respect to fuzzy coalition variables.
Proof. Let̃and̃be any two fuzzy coalitions and nonnegative variables and ; we will prove that if (̃,̃) → 0, then
Note that V ∈ ( , V) is finite such that ∑ max ⊆ , ⊆ (V( ), V( )) ≤ and > 0 is a sufficient great constant, that is,
Therefore, V ∈ Cav ( ) is continuous with respect to fuzzy coalition variables. 
By (11), we also get
From the above examples, we note that
for anỹ,̃∈ ( ).
Imputation of Fuzzy Games with the Concave Integral
Imputation is an important concept; players will get rational share from a cooperative team work, where he gets more shares than he gets by working alone, and the sum of all players' shares in a team is equal to the team value. Next, we will extend the crisp imputation to fuzzy game.
Definition 33. Let V ∈ Cav ( ); a fuzzy coalitioñ∈ ( ) with variable = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) ; a vector function Cav : ( ) → + is called an imputation if
wherẽ= (0, 0, . . . , , . . . , 0) and
. . , Cav (̃)). We denote the set of all imputations of the fuzzy game V ∈ Cav ( ) on the fuzzy coalitioñ∈ ( ) as (V Cav )(̃).
Theorem 34. Let a vector = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) ∈ (V)( ) for crisp cooperative game V ∈ ( , V), and then
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Proof. For crisp cooperative game V ∈ ( , V), define fuzzy coalitioñ∈
On the other hand,
Therefore, Cav = (
Corollary 35. Let a vector = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) ∈ (V)( ) for crisp cooperative game V ∈ ( , V), and fuzzy coalitioñ∈ ( ) has fuzzy coalition variable
Remark 36. When V ∈ ( , V) and (V)( ) is nonempty, then (V Cav )(̃) is nonempty for fuzzy game V(̃) ∈ Cav ( ), where fuzzy coalitioñis determined by ∑ ⊆ 1 = (∀ ≥ 0). Corollary 37. Let V ∈ 0 ( , V); fuzzy coalitioñis determined by ∑ ⊆ 1 = (∀ ≥ 0), and then
where ℎ(V) = ( ℎ 1 (V), ℎ 2 (V), . . . , ℎ (V)) is the Shapley vector for crisp game V ∈ 0 ( , V).
Example 38. Let = {1, 2, 3}, V({1}) = 100, V({2}) = V({3}) = 200, V({1, 2}) = V({1, 3}) = 600, V({2, 3}) = 800, and V({1, 2, 3}) = 1200.
Suppose a decomposition 1 = {1, 2, 3}, 2 = {2, 3}, 3 = {3}, 
The crisp Shapley values are obtained as in Table 2 . 
In fact, ∑ ∈ ∑ ⊆supp(̃) ( ) = 420 = V Cav (̃), so 
Conclusions
In this paper, an extended game with fuzzy coalition variables and a characteristic function calculation technique is presented for solving a class of games when the available information is limited to a few events. The linear formula of the new game is established by the maximum integral on these characteristic functions on subdecompositions of crisp coalitions.
By comparing the present definitions for games with fuzzy coalitions which are actually defined by different integrals, a new integral expression of fuzzy cooperative game is discussed in detail from the view of Concave integral. Because the characteristic function of the proposed game considers all events or possible coalitions, it may be greater than that of game defined by Choquet integral, which was only calculated on nest coalitions.
It is natural that the Concave integral representation for fuzzy game can be regarded as a general form of cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions.
